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Fier: It’s In the Bag

IT’S IN THE BAG:
VOLUNTARINESS, SCOPE, AND THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT
CONSENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
United States v. Harris1
(decided July 27, 2011)
I.

THE MATTER OF UNITED STATES V. HARRIS

The defendant in this matter made a motion to suppress evidence that was seized during a search conducted by the Agency of
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (the “ATF”) on December 22,
2010.2 Defendant‟s motion to suppress was based upon the contention that the search violated his Fourth Amendment protection against
illegal search and seizure.3 The hearing for defendant‟s motion was
scheduled and heard by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
New York on May 17, 2011.4 The court, upon its review of relevant
case law and statutory interpretations, ruled that the defendant was
not subjected to an illegal search and subsequent seizure, and, therefore, defendant‟s motion to suppress was denied.5

1

No. 11 Cr. 92(RPP), 2011 WL 3273241 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011).
Id. at *1.
3
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
4
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *1 (stating that the “hearing was commenced on May 17,
2011 . . . continued on June 3, 2011,” and was decided on July 27, 2011).
5
Id. at *15.
2

687
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The defendant, Kyle Harris, was the subject of an investigation being conducted by the ATF in connection with possession of
drugs and firearms.6 On December 22, 2010, Agent McCormick and
the ATF conducted “[an] arrest of the [d]efendant [at premises located] at 16 Holly Street in New Bedford, Massachusetts.”7 During a
sweep of the apartment, the officers located three to four persons in
the apartment, including the defendant and one Tarean Joseph, who
would later be used as a witness in the suppression hearing.8 Agent
McCormick questioned the defendant in the apartment and informed
him that he was being arrested by federal agents pursuant to his involvement in a “Hobbs Act” robbery.9 During the questioning of the
defendant, Agent McCormick asked “which room is yours,” at which
point the defendant “motioned with his head over his shoulder [to]
the room behind him.”10 The defendant was then asked whether there
were guns or drugs present in the room, to which he said no. 11 The
agent asked if he could enter the room, to which the defendant responded with something to the effect of “[s]ure.”12
While the exact response given by the defendant is questionable, Agent McCormick noted at the suppression hearing that the defendant‟s answer was “definitely affirmative that [the agent] could
search his room.”13 Agent McCormick did not remove defendant‟s
6

Id. at *1.
Id.
8
Id. Agent McCormick noted that the defendant was sitting on “a couch in the middle of
the living room,” Mr. Joseph was “in a chair on the right of the room,” and a third person
was “sitting in the back of the room on another chair. Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *2.
9
Id. at *2-3; 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006). The Hobbs Act states, in pertinent part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Id.
10
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *2.
11
Id.
12
Id.; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) (stating that one exception to the necessity for a
search warrant is the voluntary consent of the accused to the search)).
13
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *2 (stating that the defendant‟s response was “clear[ ],”
made in the presence of other officers, and was not made while any of the agents‟ guns were
drawn).
7
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handcuffs to have him sign a written consent to the search, due to the
nature of crime he was accused of committing.14 Agent Michael
Zeppieri, the supervising agent of the task force assigned to the investigation, affirmed that the defendant gave his verbal consent to have
the room searched shortly after being read his Miranda rights.15 At
the suppression hearing, Mr. Joseph, the individual who answered the
door when the police arrived, stated that the officers “never showed
[the warrant] to them,” and that he “never heard any officer ask [the
defendant] for consent to search his room.”16 Agent McCormick refuted this, contending that Mr. Joseph was being questioned by a police detective, and would not have heard such a brief exchange between the defendant and the questioning agents.17
In the search of the defendant‟s bedroom that followed, a
sealed backpack was uncovered by ATF agents, which was subsequently opened.18 The search of the backpack and room yielded “a
digital scale, several cell phones, and a Police Athletic League Identification from the Bronx for [the defendant].”19 According to the
agents, at no time did the defendant or Mr. Joseph object to the
search of the room.20
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found
during the search of his bedroom.21 Defense counsel argued that no
constitutionally valid consent was given to the officers to search. 22 In
the event that consent could have been determined by the court to be
given to the agents, the defendant contended that the consent was not
voluntary, and, furthermore, that the search of the closed backpack
was not within the general scope of consent to search a room.23
The court acknowledged that “[w]arrantless searches „are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment−subject to only a few

14

Id. at *3 (stating that the arrest warrant for the defendant was issued in connection with
a “robbery [in which] the victim was very brutally stabbed”).
15
Id. at *8.
16
Id. at *7.
17
Id. at *12.
18
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13.
19
Id. at *3.
20
Id. at *3-4.
21
Id at *1.
22
Id. at *10.
23
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *10.
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specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.‟ ”24 Among
these limited exceptions is consent given by the individual being
searched or someone with the authority over the area being
searched.25 In order for such consent to be constitutionally valid, the
court looked to well-established federal case law on consent, which
point to the necessity of the consent to be “freely and voluntarily given.”26 Further, the prosecution bears “the burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given by a preponderance
of the evidence.”27
The court in Harris agreed with the prosecution that the defendant consented to the search of his bedroom by the arresting officers.28 While the testimony of the two officers differed slightly, the
“pivotal fact [that the defendant] . . . consented to the search” of his
room remained consistent between the two.29 The defendant‟s acknowledgment of his room, the subsequent nod towards the room,
and the affirmative response given to the agent‟s request to enter and
search all comprised consent.
The existence of consent did not completely defeat the defendant‟s motion to suppress. The prosecution still bore the burden to
show that the consent was “voluntarily given,” otherwise it would be
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.30 At the time the defendant
gave his consent to the search, he remained handcuffed on the sofa
and did not exhibit any aggressive or fearful behaviors.31 The court
24
Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal citations omitted)).
25
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (stating that consent to a search is a “specifically established exception” to the necessity of a search warrant); United States v. Buettner-Janusch,
646 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Government may scrutinize even the most private
enclosure if the third party has the authority to permit the intrusion.”).
26
See United States v. Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that voluntary consent is “essentially free and unconstrained [by] . . . all of the surrounding circumstances”).
27
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *10 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. PorrasQuintero, No. 07 CR 228(RPP), 2007 WL 4531552, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007)).
28
Id. at *11.
29
Id.
30
Id. (quoting Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d at 57 (“The test of voluntariness is whether the
consent was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, and is
a question of fact to be determined from all of the surrounding circumstances.”)); see also
United States v. Kon Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that consent may be
invalidated if it was given under “duress or coercion”).
31
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13 (“Mr. Harris was calm during the encounter, and the
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found that at no point during the time where consent was requested
did the officers draw their weapons or make any actions to intimidate
or force the defendant to agree to a search.32 In an examination of the
“totality of the surrounding circumstances,” the court held that the
defendant was not coerced or intimidated into granting consent, but
rather that it was given freely and volitionally.33 Because the consent
was voluntary, it was constitutionally valid under the Fourth
Amendment.34
The last argument that the court considered in the defendant‟s
motion to suppress was the defendant‟s contention that the search of
the backpack in the bedroom was outside the scope of the consent
given.35 The Supreme Court established the standard of “ „objective‟
reasonableness” in order to determine whether the search conducted
was within the scope of consent given.36 The scope of consent is ascertainable by determining what would be “objectively reasonable for
the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect‟s consent permitted
him to [search].”37 Consent to a search can either be given to police
officers open-endedly, or limited to a specified area.38
In answering the agent‟s request to “take a look around,” the
defendant simply responded with a “yes,” “sure,” or some other short
affirmative.39 This request, as asked by the officers after the defendant indicated his room, provided notice to the defendant that they intended to search the area to which the defendant signaled.40 Given
his short affirmative response, an objectively reasonable individual
would have believed that the entire room and its contents were within
the scope of the consent granted by the defendant.41 By giving a gedefense witness Mr. Joseph testified that [the defendant] joked with the officers.”).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See Kon Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d at 41 (“Consent to search should be deemed valid if . . .
[it] was voluntarily given . . . .”).
35
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13.
36
Id. at *14 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (stating that an “objective reasonableness” standard should be applied in determining the scope of consent given)).
37
Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1995)).
38
See United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that open ended
consent could be reasonably construed to lack any form of limitation).
39
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *14.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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neralized or open-ended consent, the agents were entitled to look anywhere within the room for evidence of illegal activities, even inside
of sealed containers.42 In the event the defendant wished to limit the
search to specific areas within his room, he needed only to voice his
objection and limitation.43 Therefore, the search of the closed backpack located within the defendant‟s bedroom was within the scope of
consent given to the agents.44
Because the defendant was found to have voluntarily granted
consent to a search of his bedroom by the arresting ATF agents, and
the objects searched and subsequently seized from the room were
within the scope of consent given, the evidence at issue was deemed
admissible.45 The defendant did not indicate that he wished to limit
the scope of the consent he granted, nor was he coerced or strongarmed into granting said consent.46 The court determined that the defendant‟s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures was not violated and, therefore, denied the defendant‟s motion to suppress the aforementioned evidence.47
II.

FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT TO A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
people from unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement
and government agencies.48 The Constitution has only one exception
directly built into the verbiage of the construction of the Amendment,
that such a search may be conducted with probable cause.
In the seminal case, Mapp v. Ohio,49 lewd and lascivious con42

Id. (quoting Snow, 44 F.3d at 135 (“[I]t is self-evident that a police officer seeking general permission to search a [room] is looking for evidence of illegal activity. It is just as obvious that such evidence might be hidden in closed containers.”)).
43
Id. (stating that “[t]he agents‟ interpretation of his consent as including the right to
search containers, such as backpacks, found in the bedroom was objectively reasonable,” and
valid within the confines of the Fourth Amendment).
44
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *14.
45
Id. at *15.
46
Id.; cf. Garcia, 56 F.3d at 422 (“So long as police do not coerce consent, a search conducted on the basis of consent is not an unreasonable search.”).
47
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *15.
48
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49
367 U.S. 643 (1961).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/15

6

Fier: It’s In the Bag

2012]

IT’S IN THE BAG

693

traband was seized from the defendant‟s home during a warrantless
search that was used to arrest her for a crime separate and apart from
the purpose of the search.50 While following up on information the
police had received that the defendant was hiding the perpetrator of a
bombing, officers arrived at the house, demanded entrance, and subsequently forced their way into the property.51 The officers did not
discover the individual they were searching for, but rather, found
sexual and pornographic materials that were illegal under state law.52
At trial, the court found that the police officers acted legally within
the confines of probable cause in their search and seizure of the materials at issue.53
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case as a result of its determination that such a search violates the Fourth
Amendment.54 In reaffirming its holding in Weeks v. United States,55
the Court reiterated its interpretation of the effect of the language of
the Fourth Amendment:
[T]he 4th Amendment put the courts of the United
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their
power and authority, under limitations and restraints
(and) forever secure(d) the people, their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable
searches and seizures under the guise of law and the
duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon
all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.56
In Mapp, the Supreme Court showed its proclivity towards a
strict interpretation of the language of the Constitution in regards to
50

Id. at 643 (“[T]he Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though
„based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures
unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant‟s home.‟ ”).
51
Id. at 644 (“Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the door and demanded entrance but appellant . . . refused to admit them without a search warrant . . .
[which led to] at least one of the several doors to the house [being] forcibly opened . . .
[through which] the policemen gained admittance.”).
52
Id. at 645.
53
Id.
54
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
55
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 647 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92).
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the ability of law enforcement and the courts to search a person or
property without a warrant.57 Absent a substantial reason justifying
probable cause, the Court here established its view on cases involving
otherwise unreasonable search and seizure.58
a.

Federal Interpretation of Voluntariness of Consent

In certain situations, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of exceptions to the necessity of a search
warrant in the pursuit of justice.59 One of these exceptions is the voluntary consent to a warrantless search by the individual being
searched, or by a person with the authority to consent to a search over
a certain area.60 So long as the consent given to a search is voluntary,
the subsequent search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.61
The Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte62 sought to provide
guidance as to what constitutes “voluntariness” for the purposes of
valid consent.63 The defendant in this matter was subjected to a
search of his vehicle by a police officer following a routine traffic
stop, which led to his arrest for possession of a check with the intent
to defraud.64 The Court granted certiorari for the purposes of determining whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
consent must be uncoerced and made with the knowledge that such
consent “could be freely and effectively withh[e]ld.”65
In referring to earlier case law on the issue, the Court noted
that no previous cases involving unreasonable search and seizure
provided a clear and “talismanic definition of „voluntariness‟ mechanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has

57
Id. at 659 (“If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”).
58
Id. at 660.
59
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970)).
60
Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)).
61
See id.
62
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
63
Id. at 223-24.
64
Id. at 219-20.
65
Id. at 221-22 (stating that the district court denied the defendant‟s writ of habeas corpus
and defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which subsequently “vacated
the order denying the writ and remanded the case”).
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arisen.”66 Given the broad scope of scenarios where voluntariness is
at issue, the Supreme Court reflected upon the “test of voluntariness”
as established by English and American courts over the prior two
hundred years, which was to be applied in the questioning of suspects.67 As the Court explained, this test consists of the following
question:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has
willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is
not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.68
The Court in Schneckloth qualified this test by including a requirement for the assessment of “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances” in order to determine the will of the defendant.69 This
standard, as the Court stated, is to be utilized to determine the voluntariness of consent to a search.70 The Court, in applying its test, held
that the state bears only the burden of showing that the search was
made with consent, and that the consent was not the product of “duress or coercion, express or implied.”71 The determination of voluntariness is fact-specific and is “to be determined from all the circumstances . . . of which the [defendant‟s] knowledge of a right to refuse
is a factor.”72
In a pair of cases occurring approximately a decade apart, the
Court examined whether the boarding of buses by police officers and
their subsequent request to search passengers and luggage coerced
passengers to consent.73 In both of these cases, the Court focused on
the circumstances surrounding the searches, and whether a reasonable
person in the place of the defendants would have understood that they
66

Id. at 224.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
68
Id. at 225-26 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
69
Id. at 226.
70
Id. at 227.
71
Id. at 248-49. The case was reversed on the basis that the Ninth Circuit applied an inappropriate standard in determining the voluntariness of consent.
72
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
73
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
67
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could refuse to consent to a search.74 In Florida v. Bostick,75 police
officers boarded a bus and requested to see passengers‟ identification,
tickets and inspect their luggage for narcotics.76 By positioning
themselves in the aisle, the officers essentially blocked off the passengers means of egress from the bus.77 The defendant, a passenger
on the bus, was subsequently questioned by officers and informed of
his right to refuse, but he granted consent to the officers, who subsequently found cocaine in his luggage and arrested him.78 The Court
granted certiorari in order to determine whether the officers‟ boarding
of the bus “constitute[d] a „seizure,‟ ” and whether an individual on
the bus would have been coerced into granting consent to a search
thereafter.79
The scenario in United States v. Drayton80 was very similar to
the facts of Bostick. In Drayton, officers boarded a stopped bus at a
rest stop and asked passengers for permission to search for illegal
drugs or firearms.81 In a situation similar to that of Bostick, the officers positioned themselves at the front and rear of the bus, trapping the
passengers between them.82 A search of the defendants uncovered
two bundles containing over half a kilogram of cocaine in total.83
Here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the defendants were “seized” by not being informed of their right to refuse a
search, and whether their ensuing consent to the search was voluntary.84
In both cases, the Supreme Court held in favor of the state.85
74

See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207-08; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40.
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
76
Id. at 431-32.
77
Id. at 435.
78
Id. at 432 (“[P]olice specifically advised [defendant] that he had a right to refuse consent . . . [and] at no time did the officers threaten [the defendant] . . . .”).
79
Id. at 433-34.
80
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
81
Id. at 197-99.
82
Id. at 197-98.
83
Id. at 199.
84
Id. at 197 (stating that the Court was required to consider whether passengers must be
advised by officers of “their right not to cooperate” or consent to a search).
85
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207-08 (holding that officers do not need to inform persons of
their right to refuse a search, so long as a reasonable individual would have construed that
they have such a right); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40 (holding that consent to a search is voluntary if a reasonable person would understand that consent to said search may be lawfully
75
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The Court in Bostick applied the similar voluntariness standard as applied in Schneckloth, and held that, upon a review of the totality of
the “circumstances surrounding the encounter,” consent to a search is
voluntary when a reasonable person would understand that he or she
has the right to refuse to give such consent.86 The Court in Drayton
came to a similar conclusion. Because the defendants were not confronted or threatened in any manner and “a reasonable person [would
have known] that he or she was free to refuse [giving consent],” the
consent given was voluntary and valid.87
The Second Circuit has also qualified what it considers valid
voluntary consent. In United States v. Garcia,88 the court considered
whether consent to a search, apart from being voluntary, needs also to
be “knowing” consent.89 The defendant in this case was subjected to
a search by police officers who suspected him of having purchased a
firearm.90 The defendant‟s wife granted the police access to the
home, and, after a discussion with the officers, the defendant retrieved and presented the firearm in question to the officers.91 The
defendant, although not arrested at the time, was later arrested and
indicted following an act of vandalism on the car of the person who
informed the officers about the firearm.92
Following a suppression hearing in which evidence was suppressed pursuant to the district court‟s finding that “consent was [not]
given knowingly and voluntarily,” the Court of Appeals heard the
state‟s appeal.93 While the court acknowledged that a waiver of one‟s
rights is inherent in the process of a fair criminal trial, it explained
that Fourth Amendment cases are held to different standards, as set
forth in Schneckloth and its progeny.94 Since knowledge is only a
refused).
86
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
87
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206-07.
88
56 F.3d 418 (2d Cir. 1995).
89
Id. at 422, 424.
90
Id. at 420 (stating that the defendant “had been [previously] convicted of a felony,”
more specifically, assault, and was “in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)”).
91
Id. at 420-21.
92
Id. at 421.
93
Garcia, 56 F.3d at 421-22.
94
Id. at 422 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241 (explaining the “vast difference between” rights protected in a criminal trial versus those protected by the Fourth Amendment)).
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factor to be considered by a court analyzing the “totality of all the
circumstances” involved in consent given to a search, there is no sufficient legal basis for the trial court‟s requiring that the defendant‟s
consent was “knowing,” in addition to being voluntary.95
b.

Federal Interpretation of the Scope of Consent

The federal judiciary has also addressed the limitation upon
what is included within the scope of consent given by an individual to
law enforcement. In its general analyses of consent, the Supreme
Court has always defaulted to the reasonableness of a search under
the Fourth Amendment.96 The same concept of “reasonableness” has
been recognized as the limiting factor in the scope of consent given,
as outlined in Florida v. Jimeno.97
In Jimeno, the defendant was pulled over by an officer in a
routine traffic stop.98 Believing the defendant to be in the possession
of narcotics, the officer “asked permission to search the car,” informed the defendant of his right to refuse, and was subsequently
granted consent by the defendant.99 The search uncovered a “brown
paper bag, [which was located] on the floorboard,” and was found to
contain a “kilogram of cocaine.”100 The defendant was arrested and,
prior to trial, “moved to suppress the cocaine” because he did not believe that the search he allegedly consented to included the opening
of bags and containers in his car, namely the one containing the cocaine.101
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
closed containers, which “might reasonably hold the object of the
search,” are excluded from general consent to a search.102 In its ex95
Id. at 424 (stating that a defendant‟s “lack of awareness” only matters if consent was
given under duress or was coerced).
96
Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
97
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)).
98
Id. at 249 (stating that the officer that was pursuing the defendant had overheard a
phone conversation between someone and the defendant allegedly arranging a drug transaction, which gave way to the pursuit).
99
Id. at 249-50.
100
Id. at 250.
101
Id. (emphasis added) (“[Defendant‟s] mere consent to search the car did not carry with
it specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents.”).
102
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249.
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amination of the case, the Court applied an “ „objective‟ reasonableness” standard: “[w]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect” to
have been included within the scope of the search.103 The Court concluded that an objective individual in the place of the defendant
would have reasonably foreseen that consent to a search for drugs
within an area—in this case, a car—would include containers that
might contain drugs.104
The Second Circuit maintained the same view as the Supreme
Court‟s holding in Jimeno. In United States v. Snow,105 the defendant
was stopped for a traffic violation when a police officer noticed a
shotgun in the back seat of his vehicle.106 The defendant gave the officer consent to a search of the vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of a duffel bag containing pistol parts and a small bag containing
marijuana.107 Mirroring the situation in Jimeno, a suppression hearing was held to determine whether evidence found in closed containers should be considered inadmissible as outside the scope of the
search‟s consent.108
In its application of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Jimeno,
the court expounded upon what the officer intended by the word
“search.”109 The court held that, by any definition of the word
“search,” a reasonable individual would imply that a consented-to
search would include any “readily-opened, closed containers discovered inside the car.”110 In its explanation, the court recognized that an
individual has the “right to limit the scope of his consent.”111
A more recent case in the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Lucas,112 addressed the scope of a search within a private residence.113
103

Id. at 251.
Id. at 251-52 (delineating between a reasonable search within an unlocked container
versus an unreasonable search of a locked container).
105
44 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1995).
106
Id. at 134.
107
Id.
108
Id. (stating that the district court suppressed the items that were found in the closed
containers, but not the shotgun, which was considered as “in plain view” of the arresting officer).
109
Id. at 135.
110
Snow, 44 F.3d at 135.
111
Id. (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252).
112
640 F.3d 168 (6th Cir. 2011).
104
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In Lucas, police responded to an informant‟s tip about the defendant‟s purported marijuana-growing operation in his home.114 After
speaking with the defendant, one of the detectives noticed marijuana
paraphernalia and requested to search the house.115 The defendant
granted consent to a limited search of his residence which was to include a search for “illegal controlled substances, drug paraphernalia,
and „other material or records pertaining to narcotics.‟ ”116 During an
inspection of a laptop that police expected to contain records related
to the defendant‟s marijuana production, officers uncovered images
of child pornography in an attached flash drive.117
In its review of defendant‟s appeal from a suppression hearing, the court considered whether a personal computer is within the
scope of a search of a private residence.118 Because the defendant
maintained written records of his marijuana-growing operations, the
court recognized that the officer‟s expectation that more records were
on the laptop was reasonable.119 Furthermore, the laptop was not secured by a password, which the court maintained was the equivalent
of an unlocked container in a vehicle.120 Lastly, the court held that
the search of the attached flash drive was not unconstitutional, as
upon his recognition of pornographic images of children, the detective ceased his search and awaited the issuance of a search warrant.121
c.

Federal Interpretation of Who May Grant Consent

Apart from the issues of the voluntariness and scope of con113

Id. at 175, 177.
Id. at 170.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 170-71 (stating that the defendant signed a form consenting to the search after
being told that a search warrant would most likely be issued on the basis of “probable cause”
should he not sign.).
117
Lucas, 640 F.3d at 172, 179 (explaining that prior to continuing his search of the flash
drive, the detective stopped “in anticipation of obtaining a search warrant,” and defendant
was later indicted on charges for possession of both the marijuana as well as the child pornography).
118
Id. at 177 (stating that the Sixth Circuit had “not previously issued a published opinion
applying the analysis of . . . automobile search cases . . . [to] a consent search of a personal
computer located inside a private residence”).
119
Id. at 177-78.
120
Id. at 178.
121
Id. at 179-80.
114
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sent granted by a person subject to a search, the federal courts have
also explored the issue of who may grant valid consent to a search
aside from the party in question. In United States v. Matlock,122 the
United States Supreme Court was faced with this very question.123 At
issue in this case was whether the voluntary consent of one Ms.
Graff, who granted police consent to search a bedroom she shared
with the defendant, was valid under the Fourth Amendment.124
Police arrested the defendant in Matlock outside of his home
for the “robbery of a federally insured bank . . . [under] 18 U.S.C. [§]
2113.”125 Subsequent to the arrest, the officers were admitted to the
home by Ms. Graff and given access to search the bedroom she
shared with the defendant for a weapon and stolen money, the latter
of which was found inside a bag in the bedroom closet.126 Following
the arrest, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
found in the bedroom, arguing that he did not consent to the search.127
The district court, and, subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, both held in favor of the defendant, citing that Ms.
Graff did not have the “actual authority to consent to the search” on
behalf of the defendant.128
In hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit‟s decision.129 The Supreme Court held that for third
party consent to a warrantless search to be valid, the grantor of the
consent must “possess[ ] common authority over [the area to be
searched] or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
sought to be inspected.”130 In this case, the prosecution showed that
Ms. Graff had sufficient control and authority over the bedroom, and,
in the absence of the defendant, could grant consent to a warrantless
search of the room.131
122

415 U.S. 164 (1974).
Id. at 166 (determining whether consent by a third party to search another‟s living
quarters is valid to render evidence seized as admissible).
124
Id. at 166-67.
125
Id. at 166.
126
Id. at 166-67.
127
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
128
Id. at 167-69.
129
Id. at 169.
130
Id. at 171 (stating that the prosecution must show that a sufficient relationship existed
between the third party and the area of which the search is being consented to).
131
Id. at 176-77.
123
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The Supreme Court considered yet another issue in regards to
third party consent in Illinois v. Rodriguez.132 In Rodriguez, police
responded to a call made by a woman, Ms. Fischer, who claimed she
was assaulted by the defendant.133 Ms. Fischer went with the police
to the apartment where the defendant resided, which she referred to
as “our” apartment, and granted the officers access to the apartment.134 After seeing drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view, the
officers proceeded to the bedroom where they discovered more drugs
and the defendant, who was placed under arrest.135
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that
Ms. Fischer had previously “vacated the apartment” and therefore
had no authority to give consent to a search.136 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the officers reasonably believed Ms. Fischer had the authority to give consent to a search and
conducted said search in reliance on that belief.137 The Court likened
this situation to that of police officers entering premises without a
warrant because they reasonably, yet incorrectly, “believe they are in
pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.”138 In such cases,
there is no violation of the defendant‟s Fourth Amendment rights.139
The Court reiterated, as established previously in Brinegar v. United
States,140 that “[b]ecause many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room
must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes
must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability.”141 The Supreme Court ultimately

132

497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Id. at 179.
134
Id. at 179-80.
135
Id. at 180 (stating that the defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver).
136
Id. (stating that the defendant‟s motion was granted by the county court and later affirmed by the appellate court).
137
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179, 181 (stating that the Supreme Court is faced with an issue
it “expressly reserved in Matlock,” whether third party consent to a warrantless search is valid if the police reasonably believe the third party has the common authority to grant such
consent, but, in fact, does not) (emphasis added).
138
Id. at 186.
139
Id. at 189.
140
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
141
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176).
133
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held that third party consent is valid, even if based upon erroneous
authority, so long as the officers reasonably believed the party to
have the actual authority to consent to such a search.142
The Second Circuit has further explored the issue of who may
grant valid consent under the Fourth Amendment. In United States v.
Buettner-Janusch,143 the court examined the question of whether
another exception exists that gives a third party the right to consent to
a search over an area of “common authority.”144 In this case, a search
was conducted in the defendant‟s laboratory after defendant‟s colleagues contacted the authorities believing that the defendant was
manufacturing illegal narcotics at his place of employment.145 The
defendant‟s research assistant and a fellow professor gave consent to
the officers to search the laboratory where they worked, and the
search yielded evidence of precursor materials used for the manufacture of LSD and other illegal drugs.146 The defendant was arrested
and found guilty on a number of counts involving the manufacture,
possession, and intent to sell illegal drugs.147
The consent to the search at issue was given by the defendant‟s colleagues and employer, and not by the defendant himself.148
The Second Circuit acknowledged the existence of third-party consent as an exception to the Fourth Amendment‟s limitation of
searches.149 The Second Circuit had previously established a rule
that: “[c]onsent to a search by one with access to the area searched,
and either common authority over it, a substantial interest in it or
permission to exercise that access, express or implied, alone validates

142

Id. at 188-89.
646 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 802054).
144
Id. at 761, 764.
145
Id. at 761.
146
Id. at 763.
147
Id. at 763-64.
148
Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d at 764 (“Throughout this litigation, the prosecution has
maintained that the May 17 search was validated by the consent of Jolly and Richard Macris,
[the defendant‟s colleagues, and such] . . . consent to search was freely and voluntarily given.”).
149
Id. (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (explicating that third party consent to a search
is valid “when a defendant can be said to have assumed the risk that someone having authority over the area” may grant such consent to officers)).
143
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the search.”150 In applying the aforementioned rule, the court here
determined that both the research assistant and professor had access
to and common authority over the laboratory in which they all
worked, but by granting access to his colleagues, the defendant gave
up any reasonable expectation of privacy that would have invalidated
the search.151 Ultimately, the court held that a third party, such as a
coworker, may grant consent to a search over an area of shared common authority, and affirmed the conviction of the defendant.152
III.

NEW YORK STATE’S INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT TO A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH

Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution provides for the right of individuals to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .
and [that] no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”153 This part of Section 12 mirrors verbatim the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This is evidence of the desire of the framers of the state constitution to maintain the same level of security of the fundamental
protection against unreasonable search and seizure as those who
drafted the federal Constitution. For this reason, cases in the state
courts involving searches are particularly scrutinized in order to determine whether there truly was consent. The decisions of the New
York state courts have traditionally afforded greater protections to
defendants in these seizure cases, making it more difficult for the
prosecution to meet the standard to prove that consent was voluntarily given and that the search conducted fell within the scope of consent given.154

150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1974)).
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 765, 767.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1976).
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New York State’s Interpretation of Voluntariness
of Consent

The New York Court of Appeals has traditionally maintained
a similar standpoint on voluntariness of consent as the federal judiciary, that consent to search, so long as it is voluntarily given, is a
waiver of Fourth Amendment protections.155 In People v. Kuhn,156
the court reviewed a pair of cases in which the defendants alleged a
violation of their constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure.157 In these cases, the defendants were both subjected to searches in an airport to after giving verbal consent to officers.158 Both defendants were subsequently arrested for possession of
illicit materials.159
The court examined whether or not the defendants gave valid
voluntary consent.160 In both cases, the court held that the state “sustained its burden of establishing a voluntary consent,” as set forth by
the standards in Schneckloth.161 The defendants both gave verbal affirmative consent, and the officers conducting the searches did not act
in a manner that was coercive or intimidating to the defendants.162
The Court of Appeals in People v. Gonzalez163 drastically
modified the way New York courts approach the issue of voluntariness of consent.164 In Gonzalez, the defendants were a husband and
wife arrested for the possession of drugs after the husband was set-up
in a drug transaction with federal agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration.165 After an initial altercation between the agents and
the defendant-husband, the defendants were handcuffed and sepa-

155

See People v. Kuhn, 306 N.E.2d 777, 779 (N.Y. 1973) (referencing Davis, 328 U.S.

582).
156

306 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1973).
Id. at 778.
158
Id. at 778-79.
159
Id. (stating that defendant Boungermino was arrested for possession of marijuana, and
defendant Kuhn was arrested for possession of a hypodermic needle and heroin).
160
Id. at 779.
161
Kuhn, 306 N.E.2d at 779 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221).
162
Id.
163
347 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1976).
164
Id. at 580-81.
165
Id. at 577-78.
157
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rated.166 The agents informed the defendants of their desire to search
the home, and had both of them sign a written statement consenting
to the search.167
On the state‟s appeal from a suppression hearing, the court
applied a four-prong analysis to determine whether a defendant has
given valid voluntary consent under the state and federal constitutions.168 The four factors the court took into consideration were:
[W]hether the consenter is in custody or under arrest,
and the circumstances surrounding the custody or arrest[,] . . . the background of the consenter [or experience dealing with police officers,] . . . whether the
consenter has been, previously to the giving of consent, or for that matter even later, evasive or uncooperative with the law enforcement authorities[,] . . .
[and] whether the defendant was advised of his right
to refuse to consent.169
In its analysis of the situation experienced by the defendants, the
court determined that the defendants: were detained and intimidated
by the presence of a large number of federal agents; had little experience in dealing with the police; responded to the agents in a defiant
and resistive manner, and; while presented with a form advising them
of their right to refuse consent, were in a coercive atmosphere that
negated any exercise of their right to refuse.170 While the court noted
that the last factor regarding knowledge of the right to refuse is not
requisite, the sum of the circumstances surrounding the arrest resulted
in a violation of the defendants‟ rights under both the federal and
state constitutions.171
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has applied a
slightly more stringent interpretation as to what qualifies as voluntary
166

Id. at 578.
Id. at 579 (explaining that the defendant-husband stated, at the time of his signing the
consent form, that he did not know whether or not “his wife had disposed of the drugs” prior
to letting the agents into the apartment).
168
Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580-81.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 581-82.
171
Id. at 582 (“The instant seizure would have hardly survived scrutiny if the matter had
been prosecuted in the Federal courts as the agents at some point had intimated they would
do. It may not survive scrutiny in the State courts.”).
167
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consent to a search. In People v. Schwab,172 the court was faced with
the issue of whether a search conducted by police officers of an
apartment was a violation of the defendant‟s Fourth Amendment
rights.173 The officers entered the building under what was claimed
to be valid consent from the defendants, and “seized contraband
items,” namely controlled substances.174
On appeal from a hearing denying suppression of the evidence seized, the Fourth Department sought to expand upon the definition of what constitutes voluntary consent to a search.175 In applying a statement made in United States v. Smith,176 the court held that,
in order for consent to be voluntary, it must be “unequivocal, specific
and intelligently given.”177 This standard enlarges the burden placed
upon the state in showing that the consent given was, in fact, voluntary.178
b.

New York State’s Interpretation of the Scope of
Consent

The Court of Appeals has also expanded upon the federal judiciary‟s interpretation regarding the scope of a search conducted by
officers subsequent to valid voluntary consent. In People v.
Adams,179 police officers were in pursuit of the defendant who threatened to shoot his girlfriend by pointing a gun at her and subsequently
opened fire on an officer.180 The defendant fled, and the officers
were led by his girlfriend to the apartment where he was hiding.181
172

382 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1976).
Id. at 158.
174
Id. at 159 (stating that the officers‟ entry onto the premises was not conducted due to
“exigent circumstances” and must thereby rely on valid voluntary consent).
175
Id. (recognizing that consent to a search must be “freely and voluntarily given,” and
that it is not voluntary “if it is the product of duress or coercion”).
176
308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962).
177
Schwab, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (stating that the search of defendant‟s home failed to
meet this requirement (quoting Smith, 308 F.2d at 663)).
178
See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (“When a prosecutor seeks to
rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”).
179
422 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1981).
180
Id. at 538.
181
Id. (stating that the defendant‟s girlfriend had a key to the apartment and was able to
give the police access to the apartment).
173
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The girlfriend also told officers where the defendant stored weapons
and ammo.182 The defendant was arrested five days later.183
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the
weapons, arguing that the scope of the consent given to the officers to
conduct a warrantless search did not include the search of a closet.184
On appeal from the denial of the defendant‟s motion, the Court of
Appeals determined that the officers relied on the apparent authority
of the girlfriend to consent to entry into the apartment and that any
subsequent search would need to be objectively reasonable.185 The
court held that “it was clearly reasonable [under the circumstances]
for the officers . . . to rely on [the girlfriend‟s] apparent capability to
consent to a search of the closet . . . .”186 While acting under the exigent circumstances of the situation, the officers were still bound to
the “objective reasonableness” standard outlined by the Supreme
Court in Jimeno.187
The Court of Appeals has also determined that the scope of
consent in a search is limited to the general consent given, and that
such consent does not include the material alteration of an area to
find the suspected evidence.188 In People v. Gomez,189 a police officer pulled a car over for a routine traffic stop and noticed, upon inspection, that the car possessed characteristics of vehicles that are often used in narcotics trafficking and transport.190 The officer
requested consent to search, which was granted by the defendant.191
182
Id. at 538-39 (“[Defendant‟s girlfriend] pointed out the closet in which she claimed
defendant stored his weapons [and, inside,] the police found a .308 calibre rifle . . . [and]
ammunition.”).
183
Id. at 539.
184
Adams, 422 N.E.2d at 539.
185
Id. at 540-41 (“We emphasize that the police belief must be reasonable, based upon an
objective view of the circumstances present and not upon the subjective good faith of the
searching officers.”).
186
Id. at 541.
187
See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249 (holding that the scope of a search pursuant to valid consent must be that which an objectively reasonable individual would believe to be included).
188
See People v. Gomez, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 2005) (stating that an officer may
not jeopardize the “structural integrity” on the basis of general consent).
189
838 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 2005).
190
Id. at 1272 (“[U]pon [the officer‟s] inspection [of the car, he] not[ed] a fresh undercoating around the gas tank . . . a tampered registration card . . . [and] darkly tinted windows
. . . .”).
191
Id.
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Using a pocket knife and a crowbar, the officer pried up the floorboard of the vehicle and opened part of the gas tank, revealing approximately one and a half pounds of cocaine.192
In its review of the case, the Court of Appeals relied upon
precedent set forth in Jimeno and the litany of cases that followed.193
While the defendant was found to have granted general consent to the
search by the arresting officer, that search was bound by the “objective reasonableness” standard.194 In an effort to establish a clearer
standard for the scope of a search conducted with consent, the court
established that “once a search exceeds the objectively reasonable
scope of a voluntary consent, a more specific request or grant of permission is needed, in the absence of probable cause, in order to justify damage to the searched area or item sufficient to require its repair.”195 Because such a “damag[ing]” search was conducted of the
defendant‟s vehicle and exceeded the scope of consent, the case was
reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals.196
c.

New York State’s Interpretation of Who May
Grant Consent

The New York state judiciary has adopted and modified the
approach taken by the federal courts in regards to who may grant valid consent to a search. The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that,
in any area in which “two or more individuals share a common right
of access to or control,” either one of the parties may grant consent to
a warrantless search in the absence of the other.197 In addition to this
well-settled issue, the New York courts have further encountered
some unique situations in regards to third party consent to warrantless
searches and when such consent is valid under the state and federal
192

Id. at 1272-73 (stating that after his arrest and indictment, defendant filed a motion to
suppress claiming that no voluntary consent was given and that if consent could be found,
“the search exceeded the scope” of consent).
193
Id. at 1273.
194
Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251).
195
Id. at 1274; id. (Read, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority seeks to establish a
“bright-line rule[]” for determining the scope of consent, which is “eschewed” by the Supreme Court in regards to Fourth Amendment cases).
196
Id.
197
People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1979) (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at
171; People v. Wood, 293 N.E.2d 559, 560 (N.Y. 1973)).
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constitutions.
In People v. Cosme,198 the Court of Appeals was faced with
the question of whether a third party may grant consent to officers in
the presence of the suspect party and contrary to the suspect‟s denial
of such consent.199 In Cosme, the police were informed by the defendant‟s fiancée that the defendant was “storing a gun and a large quantity of cocaine in the apartment” shared by the two.200 When the officers arrived, the defendant‟s fiancée granted them access to search,
which was refused shortly thereafter by the defendant, who was
present in the home.201 Defendant was subsequently indicted for possession of narcotics and a firearm.202
Following a denial of his motion to suppress the evidence on
the basis of a lack of his consent to the search, the defendant appealed
to the Appellate Division, and ultimately the Court of Appeals.203
The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant‟s fiancée had
“an unrestricted right to share in the use” of and common authority
over the bedroom, she was allowed to grant consent to the search,
contrary to the later refusal by the defendant. 204 Because his fiancée
gave valid consent prior to his refusal, the court determined that the
defendant‟s objection to the consent was “ineffective,” as it was untimely.205
The Appellate Division, First Department, much like the
Second Circuit in Buettner-Janusch, further qualified who may grant
voluntary consent to a search in People v. Nalbandian.206 In Nalbandian, officers received a call to “interview a robbery complainant” at

198

397 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979).
Id. at 1320.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 1320-21 (stating that defendant and a friend were handcuffed by the police “under protest”).
202
Id. at 1321.
203
Cosme, 397 N.E.2d at 1321 (explaining that the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser
charge following the denial of his motion, then appealed to the Appellate Division, which
affirmed the conviction).
204
Id. at 1323.
205
Id. (stating that since the defendant gave his fiancée “an unrestricted right to share in
the use and control of the bedroom closet,” voluntary consent given by his fiancée renders
any latter opposition on his part as “ineffective”).
206
590 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1992).
199
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a shelter for men being run out of the Palace Hotel.207 The night
clerk “buzzed” the officers in and the officers proceeded to a dormitory, where they found the defendant with drugs and drug paraphernalia.208
While the hearing court suppressed this evidence as being the
product of an unreasonable and unconsented to search, the First Department reversed.209 Because the night clerk controlled access to
and from the sleeping quarters, he “was authorized by the residents
. . . to consent to entry into the room by guests, visitors, and any others who had legitimate business there.”210 Furthermore, the court
noted that the defendant could not even sustain an argument under
the Fourth Amendment, as a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
area is requisite for such an argument.211 As the defendant shared an
open “communal” room with other persons, anything done in the
open is considered “forfeit [of] any reasonable expectation of privacy.”212
In People v. Fayton,213 the Appellate Division, First Department, surveyed the scope of consent that can be given by a third party.214 The third party in this case was the complainant who had informed the police that she had been “menaced [by the defendant]
with a gun.”215 The complainant shared an apartment with the defendant and knew where the defendant kept his weapon.216 The officers
received express consent from the complainant to search the apart-

207

Id. at 886.
Id.
[The officer] noticed defendant sitting on one of the beds . . . folding a
small piece of aluminum foil. Between [the defendant‟s] legs was a
plastic bag containing white powder. The officer also noticed [on] . . .
the bed . . . a glassine envelope which the officer believed to contain heroin.
209
Id. at 887.
210
Id.
211
Nalbandian, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 887 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
212
Id.
213
715 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2000).
214
Id. at 3.
215
Id.
216
Id. (“The complainant . . . informed the police that there was a gun in the apartment
[and] gave the gun‟s precise location . . . .”).
208
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ment and subsequently arrested the defendant.217
The suppression hearing resulted in a denial of defendant‟s
motion to suppress the gun.218 On appeal, the First Department held
that an individual with apparent authority over a shared area may
both grant access to and determine the scope of the search conducted
by officers subsequent to his or her consent.219 Because there was
“no indication that the room was exclusively [the] defendant‟s,” the
scope of roommate‟s consent to search the entire apartment included
each and every room located within.220
IV.

THE VALUE OF UNITED STATES V. HARRIS

The court in Harris maintained the well-established federal
court view that the consent exception to unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment is only valid when it is voluntarily given.
Both the state and federal judiciaries support the view maintained in
Harris, that consent to a search must be “the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice.”221 The court in Harris adhered to the
time-honored approach to the federal interpretation of voluntariness,
in lieu of incorporating some of the ostensibly forward-thinking approaches of the state courts, such as the four-prong analysis established by the New York Court of Appeals in Gonzalez.222
The court in Harris also illustrates the breadth that the federal
courts are willing to give to the scope of searches conducted by officers who receive a general consent to search. The court here emphasized that a verbal consent as simple as a “ „yes‟ or „sure‟ ” provides
the groundwork for a search that an objectively reasonable individual
could understand as virtually all-inclusive, barring the few occasions
where searches may include locked areas.223 By not limiting such a
search, the court noted that general consent allows an officer to look
anywhere within a room that evidence of illegal activity could be
217

Id.
Fayton, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
219
Id. at 3.
220
Id.
221
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225).
222
See Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580-81 (explaining the four factors to be considered to
determine whether consent is truly voluntary).
223
Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *14.
218
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So long as consent to a search is made voluntarily, by a person with the authority to do so, and the scope of the conducted search
falls within what an objectively reasonable individual might ascertain
as being included in such a search, the court in Harris held that it
would be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.225 This creates
a very minute obstacle that prosecutors in a federal court would need
to surmount to establish a valid search. Harris furthers the federal
judiciary‟s apparent position in affording officers a large berth of discretion in warrantless searches following consent.
Daniel Fier*

224

Id. (quoting Snow, 44 F.3d at 135 (“It is self-evident that a police officer seeking general permission to search a [room] is looking for evidence of illegal activity. It is just as obvious that such evidence might be hidden in closed containers.”)).
225
Id. at *14-15.
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